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JUSTICE EDWARD GODFREY AND THE
ROLE OF THE TRIAL JUDGE IN THE

CRIMINAL PROCESS
Melvyn Zarr*
Justice Edward Godfrey served seven years on the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court (1976-1983) and wrote nearly one hundred
opinions in criminal cases. Any attempt to write about his work
product in these criminal cases must, of necessity, depend a good
deal on the perspective of the writer. What jumps out at me after
reading these opinions is Justice Godfrey's particular sophistication
about the role of the trial judge. This perspective might seem mildly
surprising at first glance, given that Justice Godfrey never served as
a trial judge. But upon reflection, his point of view appears part of a
realistic approach to law that looks at the practical possibilities for
action on the part of those who have been given a role to play in the
process.
This piece looks at how Justice Godfrey analyzed and shaped the
role of the trial judge at a number of stages of the criminal process:
instructing the jury, ruling on the admissibility of evidence and on
the sufficiency of the evidence to go to a jury, and sentencing. At
each stage Justice Godfrey analyzed what the trial judge should be
expected to do on his or her own, unaided by counsel, and what the
trial judge reasonably could rely on counsel to do. Where Justice
Godfrey drew the line in various situations reflects an approach to
law that warrants study. The piece concludes by trying to pull together the various line drawings to form a coherent picture.
I.

INSTRUCTING THE JURY

Justice Godfrey believed it was up to the trial judge to instruct the
jury on all the elements of the crime charged. Failure to do so could
not be harmless error and could not be excused by the failure of
counsel to assist the judge in this endeavor.
At first this position was in the minority. In State v. Smith,' the
trial judge had failed to correctly instruct the jury on all the elements of the crime. The majority opinion deemed this error harmless, drawing a spirited dissent from Justice Godfrey, who argued
that this kind of error could not be harmless. Such an error "withdraws from jury determination an essential element, which he has
* Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law; A.B., Clark University,
LL.B., Harvard University.
1. 394 A.2d 259 (Me. 1978).

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:315

not admitted, [and] effectively denies the defendant the right to trial
by jury ... "I
Justice Godfrey's position was adopted by the Law Court before
the end of his term in 1983. In State v. Earley,, the court held that
"a failure to properly instruct the jury on each of the essential elements of the offense charged affects the defendant's substantial
rights," whether or not defense counsel has asked for the proper
instructions. The only unfortunate aspect of the court's reversal of
its position was that Justice Godfrey's contribution went unrecognized; the court failed to note Justice Godfrey's dissent in Smith or
even to overrule Smith explicitly.
The year following Smith, in State v. Sommer,' Justice Godfrey
had occasion to consider the issue of what assistance from defense
counsel the trial judge could reasonably expect in framing instructions on the theory of the defense rather than on the elements of the
crime.
Sommer had been charged with criminal threatening with a dangerous weapon; he was charged with intentionally or knowingly
placing his mother in fear of imminent bodily injury by holding a
knife against her throat.5 The trial judge correctly instructed the
jury on all the elements of the crime, including the requirement that
the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt that Sommer had acted to
intentionally or knowingly place his mother in fear.6 But the trial
judge had not instructed on the defense theory that the defendant
had been too mentally ill to have had the requisite intent or knowledge. The reason was that defense counsel had not asked for such
an instruction and had not objected to the trial judge's failure to
give one.
Justice Harry Glassman, in lone dissent, argued that it was the
responsibility of the trial judge to instruct on the defense theory
whether or not defense counsel had asked for it. Justice Glassman
argued:
[Tihe failure to instruct the jury on the appropriate use of the
evidence relating to the defendant's abnormal condition of
mind deprived the defendant of a substantial right-the right
to have the jury consider all of the evidence relating to his state
of mind at the time of the commission of the prohibited acts.7
The majority disagreed with Justice Glassman on the ground that
the evidence had failed to generate the defense theory and, therefore, no such instruction would have been warranted even if it had
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Id. at 264.
454 A.2d 341, 343 (Me. 1983).
409 A.2d 666 (Me. 1979).
1& at 667-68.
l at 670.
Id at 672.
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been asked for by defense counsel: "[]n view of our conclusion that
the evidence was insufficient even to generate that issue, no such
instruction by the presiding Justice was warranted."'
The majority's evaluation of the evidence was so implausible that
Justice Godfrey concurred only in the result. To him the issue of the
sufficiency of the evidence to warrant the instruction was not
presented; the issue that was presented was whether the trial judge
had erred in not instructing on a defense theory that had not been
requested by defense counsel. Put another way, the issue was
whether the trial judge was required on his or her own to discern the
defense theory and instruct upon it, without the assistance or even
the encouragement of defense counsel. Justice Godfrey answered
no:
Although the instructions did not highlight any issue of the
defendant's capability of having the requisite mental state,
they cannot be said, in the absence of objection or request by
counsel, to have contained any "obvious error or defects"
within the meaning of Rule 52(b), M.R.Crim.P. Certainly, on
the instructions given, the jury could have found defendant
guilty only after considering whether he had the necessary
knowledge or intention and deciding that he did.9
Justice Godfrey did not state the reasons for allowing the trial
judge to rely upon defense counsel, but they can be inferred. Frst,
the trial judge does not know as much as defense counsel about the
theory of defense. Unlike elements of crimes, there are myriad theories of defense, with many variations and nuances. Unless defense
counsel is incompetent, defense counsel can and should be expected
to know what theory of defense he or she is pursuing and to properly pursue it. The trial judge lacks the information to confidently
intervene. Second, there is a species of harmless error at work here.
If defense counsel is not asking for a particular instruction, it is unlikely that defense counsel would be stressing this particular point in
closing argument. Instructions are a far less understandable or persuasive means of getting a point across to a jury than closing argument. If the point is given scant attention in closing argument, it is
less likely to be significant to the jury as a result of instructions
alone.

11.

RULINGS ON ADMISSIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

Justice Godfrey wrote the definitive opinion of the Law Court
placing squarely on the shoulders of the trial judge the duty to weigh
the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence to get to the jury. This
duty would be borne by the trial judge whether or not defense coun8. Id.at 670 n.4.
9. Id at 670 (Godfrey, J., concurring).
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sel had given assistance. Just as a trial judge is expected to know
and correctly instruct on the elements of the crime, a trial judge is
expected to correctly weigh the prosecution evidence against these
elements in order to determine whether it is enough to get to the

jury.
In State v. Van Sickle,' ° Justice Godfrey held that "the trial justice
should assess the sufficiency of the evidence at the close of all evidence and enter judgment of acquittal if he concludes the evidence
is insufficient."" The assistance of defense counsel was deemed inessential but desirable, because it could focus the trial judge's attention on a particular defect in the prosecution's presentation. Justice
Godfrey wrote:
Our holding in this regard, however, should not be interpreted
by the bar as an invitation to abandon the use of the motions
for acquittal or new trial.... Such a motion, when appropriate, serves the valuable function of focusing the trial court's
attention on the precise weakness in the evidence so that an
intelligent
and careful ruling can be made by the presiding
2
justice.'
Rulings on admissibility of evidence are different, however. Here
the assistance of counsel is required. Counsel knows more about
the overall shape of the evidence than the trial judge and can be
expected to know what is harmful and what is not. In State v.
Bazinet,13 the complaining witness in a rape case, a fifteen-year-old
girl, testified on direct examination of her prior virginity. Defense
counsel made no objection. Justice Godfrey ruled that defense
counsel lost the objection by failing to make it."n The unstated rationale was that here the trial judge could reasonably rely upon the
judgment of defense counsel. If defense counsel, who knew the evidence as a whole and the defense theory, did not feel harmed
enough by the evidence to object, the trial judge could not be reasonably expected to intervene on his or her own.
A different case is presented, however, when it is the trial judge
who is doing the questioning. In such a case Justice Godfrey would
not have required an objection by defense counsel to a prejudicial
line of judicial questioning,5 although this position was taken in dissent in State v. Bachelder.1

10. 434 A.2d 31 (Me. 1981).
11. Id at 34.
12. Id at 35.

13. 372 A.2d 1036 (Me. 1977).
14. Id at 1040.
15. 403 A.2d 754, 761-62 (Me. 1979).
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m.

SENTENCING

Justice Godfrey took a realistic view of the trial judge's role at
sentencing in State v. Plante. 6 Plante had been charged with oper7
ating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor.'
At trial his testimony minimized the amount of his drinking prior to
his arrest. After the jury found him guilty, the trial judge sentenced
Plante to the maximum sentence of ninety days' imprisonment. The
trial judge candidly stated that an important reason, if not the principal reason, for giving the maximum sentence to Plante was the
trial judge's belief that the defendant had perjured himself and had
also procured perjured testimony: "On the basis of that testimony I
feel he perjured his testimony, and he got his witnesses to come in
and perjure themselves also, and on that basis I am going to impose
a ninety-day County Jail sentence ....18
Plante appealed the sentence on the ground that the trial judge
had impermissibly based the sentence solely on his conclusion that
the defendant had perjured himself, thereby violating his due process right to be indicted, tried, and convicted of the crime of perjury,
before, in effect, being sentenced for that crime. In sum, Plante contended that the trial judge had taken on the roles of prosecutor,
judge, and jury.
Justice Godfrey, for a unanimous court, rejected this argument,
saying:
As a practical matter, the sentencing judge will almost certainly consider that factor, among others, in deciding on the
defendant's sentence. It would be an unwise rule that constrained him to do so sub silentio.19
Thus, Justice Godfrey recognized that it would be contrary to
human nature for a sentencing judge to ignore his or her own belief
that the defendant had perjured himself at trial. Given the choice
between candor and driving candor underground, Justice Godfrey
chose the former.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Justice Godfrey demonstrated a coherent vision of the role of the
trial judge in criminal cases. He distinguished what the trial judge
should be expected to know and do on his or her own from what the
trial judge reasonably could rely on counsel to do. In Justice Godfrey's jurisprudence, the trial judge is expected to know and correctly instruct juries on the elements of crimes and to assess the
sufficiency of the evidence on those elements to get to the jury. The
16. 417 A.2d 991 (Me. 1980).
17. Id. at 992.

18. Id. at 995.
19. Id. at 996 (citing United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 54 (1978)).
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trial judge reasonably could expect help from defense counsel on
the theory of the defense, the relevance of defense evidence, and the
harmfulness of prosecution evidence. In the latter category Justice
Godfrey applied concepts of unpreserved error and harmless error.
Moreover, Justice Godfrey appreciated the practical side of the judicial role and was unwilling to impose on judges rules that ignored or
denied human nature.
Justice Godfrey's great virtue as a judge was that he inspired trust
in the reader of his opinions that he was playing straight. Justice
Godfrey's judicial persona can be described aptly by the words of
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Then a Justice of the Massachusetts
Supreme Court, Holmes in 1891 had occasion to write about another judge, a former colleague and friend, who had served on that
court:
In discussion, if you did not agree with him, you always
reached an exact issue, and escape in generalities was impossible. I know few qualities which seem to me more desirable in
a judge of a court of last resort than this accuracy of thought,
and the habit of keeping one's eye on the things for which
words stand. Many men, especially as they grow older, resent
attempts to push analysis beyond consecrated phrases, or to
formulate anew .... Judge [William] Allen had none of this
weakness .... 20

20. Answer to Resolutions of the Bar, Greenfield (Sept. 15, 1891), In SPEEcHEs
BY OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES

52, 53 (1913).

